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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that when earnings are uncertain the substitution of
deficit finance for tax finance or the introduction of an unfunded social
security program will raise consumption even if all bequests reflect
intergenerational altruism. Thus, contrary to the theory developed by Barro
and a number of subsequent writers, an operative bequest motive need not imply
Ricardian equivalence.
Since there is no uncertainty in the present analysis about the date of
each individual's death, this conclusion does not depend on imperfections in
annuity markets. Nor does it depend on the existence of non-lump-sum taxes
and other distortions. Rather it follows from the result derived in the paper
that, when an individuaPs future earnings are uncertain, his future bequest
is also uncertain and his consumption therefore rises more in response to an
increase in his current disposable income than to an equal present value
increase in the disposable income of his potential heirs.
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This paper shows that when earnings are uncertain the substitution of
deficit finance for tax finance or the introduction of an unfunded social
security program will raise consumption even if all bequests reflect
intergenerational altruism. Thus, contrary to the theory developed by Barro
(1974) and a number of subsequent writers, an operative bequest motive need
not imply Ricardian equivalence. Since there is no uncertainty in the present
analysis about the date of each individual's death, this conclusion does not
depend on imperfections in annuity markets. Nor does it depend on the
existence of non-lump-sum taxes or other distortions. Rather it follows from
the result derived below that, when future earnings are uncertain, bequests
are also uncertain and that consumption therefore rises more in response to an
increase in current disposable income than to an equal present value increase
in the disposable income of the next generation.
It is useful to begin with a summary of the reasoning to be developed in
this paper. The starting point of the analysis is the observation that the
level of earnings during the "second half" of an individual's working life
cannot be accurately predicted during the earlier years. This is particularly
important among individuals in managerial, entrepreneurial and professional
occupations who account for a relatively large share of all savings and
bequests. Because of this uncertainty, it is optimal for a younger individual
to save more than he would if his expected future income were known with—2—
certainty. The uncertainty about future income also implies that an
individual during the early stage of his life does not know whether he will
later want to make a bequest to his children if he can use an annuity to avoid
accidental bequests. But even if all bequests are intended and are motivated
only by intergenerational altruism, the uncertainty of the individual's future
income means that bequests are uncertain.
This uncertainty of future bequests means that an individual is not
indifferent between receiving an additional dollar of income when he is young
and having his children later receive an amount with a present value of one
dollar. Similarly, a one dollar increase in his current disposable income
will increase his current consumption by more than a rise in his children's
income with a present value of one dollar. This in turn implies that a tax
cut financed by an increase in national debt that will be serviced by future
generations will raise current consumption. Similarly, an unfunded social
security program that promises a net transfer to the current generation from
future generations will also raise current consumption.
Before presenting a formal proof of these propositions, I will review the
current state of the debate about Ricardian equivalence in the context of an
economy in which there is no uncertainty about individual incomes. This is
done in Section 1. The second section then presents a formal model of
consumption and bequest decisions of individuals whose earnings during the
second half of their working lives are uncertain. Section 3 uses this
analysis to examine the effects of fiscal policies that transfer income to the
current generation from the next generation. A numerical illustration is
presented in Section 4. There is then a brief concluding section.—3-
1. The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
Although several economists over the years noted the possibility that the
aggregate national debt might not be regarded as a net asset because of the
implied future debt obligation and therefore that a tax cut might not induce
an increase in consumption,1 it was Robert Barro (1974) who first presented an
explicit model in which finite-lived individuals who make bequests to the next
generation will completely offset any intergenerational lump-sum transfer
imposed by the government. In Barro's analysis, an individual chooses a path
of consumption and a bequest to the next generation by maximizing a utility
function that has as its arguments the individual's own annual consumption
amounts and the utility of the next generation. A current tax cut that is
matched by a rise in national debt that is serviced by taxes on future
generations does not change the opportunity set of the representative
individual. He can maintain his own consumption path and the utility level of
the next generation by saving the entire tax cut and bequeathing it (with
accumulated interest) to the next generation. This inheritance allows the
next generation to maintain its original consumption path and to provide a
bequest to its heirs that maintains that generation's utility level.In
effect, the process of bequests makes the series of finite-lived individuals
act like an infinitely lived individual. With no change in the
infinite-horizon budget constraint, there is no reason to change consumption
at any date, thus establishing the equivalence of tax finance and debt
finance.
One line of objection to this analysis (see, e.g., James Tobin, 1980, and—4—
Martin Feldstein, 1982) is that an operative bequest motive is relatively rare
because individuals believe that the marginal utility of their own retirement
consumption exceeds the marginal utility of bequests to their children.
Defenders of Ricardian equivalence reply that bequests are In fact relatively
common among the upper income groups that account for such a large share of
total wealth accumulation and point to the evidence of Laurence Kotlikoff and
Lawrence Summers (1981) that most existing wealth can be traced to bequests
rather than to life cycle accumulation.
Andrew Abel (1985) and Zvi Eckstein, Martin Eichenbaum and Dan Peled
(1985) showed that the observation of substantial bequests does not imply an
operative bequest motive if the age at which death occurs is uncertain and an
annuity market does not exist. Moreover, in such an economy Ricardian
equivalence will be violated and fiscal policies will affect consumption.
However, annuity markets exist and, even with the less than actuarially fair
return estimated by Benjamin Friedman and Mark Warshawsky (1985), older
egoistic individuals will prefer annuities to accidental bequests.
Although the observation of bequests in an economy with an annuity market
may therefore suggest that there is an operative altruistic bequest motive of
the type assumed by Barro, other types of bequest motives have been proposed
that do not imply Ricardian equivalence. Douglas Bernstein, Andre Schlaefer,
and Lawrence Summers (1986) note that bequests may be made for the "strategic"
purpose of maintaining the attention if not the actual affection of children
and grandchildren. Laurence Kotlikoff and Avia Spivak (1981) suggest that
bequests may be the result of an explicit or implicit contract between aged
parents and their children in which the parents agree to leave a bequest if—5—
they die before a certain age while the children agree to provide support if
the parents live beyond that age and therefore exhaust their assets.
Alternatively, individuals may make bequests because they regard themselves as
"stewards" of the funds that they inherited with a moral responsibility to
bequeath at least a similar amount to their own children. Each of these
models implies that a fiscal transfer from children to parents (i.e., a tax
cut or an increase in social security retirement benefits) will not be offset
by an equivalent increase in bequests.
Economists will of course differ in the extent to which they accept the
strategic bequest, family annuity or stewardship theories as an explanation of
observed bequests. Although I believe that there is probably some truth in
each of these explanations, I doubt that they can explain the observed
bequests without reference also to intergenerational altruism. The
stewardship theory cannot explain the bequests of those who did not receive
inheritances. The family annuity theory may be relevant to some moderate
income individuals who are likely to exhaust their assets during retirement
but cannot be applied to the wealthy aged whose assets continue to increase as
they get older because their spending is less than their income. The
strategic bequest theory is more difficult to reject as the primary
explanation of observed bequests but is contrary to the persuasive "evidence"
of personal introspection as well as to the less reliable assertions of other
prospective donors. Moreover, as has been noted by Barro and others, these
other bequest motives have ambiguous implications about the direction of the
effect of fiscally imposed intergenerational transfers on current
consumption.-6-
Robert Barsky, Gregory Mankiw and Stephen Zeldes (1986) have shown how
the existence of non-lump-sum taxes on subsequent risky income can invalidate
Ricardian equivalence and cause a positive marginal propensity to consume out
of a deficit-financed increase in disposable income. Income taxes on risky
income reduce the variance of future net income, providing an otherwise
unavailable insurance to individuals that reduces precautionary savings and
increases current consumption. Barsky et. al. also show that an analagous
result holds when individuals live only one period but are uncertain about the
income that their heirs will earn. In that case, the non-lump-sum tax on
their heirs' income reduces its variance and therefore, by reducing the
expected marginal utility of such income to the initial generation, reduces
the desired bequest and increases current consumption. Their analysis is thus
fundamentally different from that of the current paper because they do not
consider the effect of an individual's own income uncertainty on his desired
level of bequests. Moreover, the non-lump-sum nature of the taxes that they
consider inevitably introduce a non-neutrality.
Abel (1986) shows how a different type of non-lump-sum tax, a progressive
tax on bequests or capital, changes the relative cost of current consumption
and bequests and thus introduces an incentive to consume more at the present
time.
The present paper shows that none of these departures from the original
Barro formulation is necessary to demonstrate that Ricardian equivalence is
false and that a fiscally mandated intergenerational transfer from the future
to the present implies an increase in current consumpton. To establish this,
I analyze a simple model in which all bequests are caused by intergenerational-.7—
altruism (i.e. there are no accidental bequests due to an uncertain time of
death and the strategic11, family altruism and stewardship motives for
bequests are ignored). All taxes and transfers are lump sum. The only
difference from the traditional model is that individuals in the first half of
their working lives are uncertain about their earnings in the second half.
2. A Life Cycle Model with Uncertain Earnings
This section extends the traditional life cycle model with bequests by
recognizing the inherent uncertainty of income in later years.2 Since the
purpose of this paper is to demonstrate a contradiction to Ricardian
equivalence in a model in which all bequests are motivated by explicit
intergenerational altruism, the model analyzed here is a very simple one that
serves this purpose rather than a more realistic model designed to explore the
response of aggregate consumption, capital accumulation, and bequests to
variations in the stochastic properties and predictability of lifetime
income.3
Consider therefore a model in which the individual lives two periods. In
the first period he works a fixed amount and receives a certain income
which includes any bequest that he receives. In the second period he also
works a fixed amount but earns an amount y2 that cannot be predicted during
the first period of life. The second period of life also contains a fixed
interval of retirement before death at a known time. Since the amount of work
1n the first and second periods and the duration of retirement are all fixed,
these quantities need not be specified explicitly. Moreover, the assumption—8-
of a known date of death is equivalent to assuming the existence of
actuarially fair annuities. Finally, there is no need to distinguish between
consumption during the working years of the second period and the
retirement years because the analysis here focuses on the way that fiscal
transfers affect consumption during the first period when subsequent Income is
unknown.
The individual's utility depends on his consumption during the first and
second periods of his life and on the utility of his children. The essential
features of the intergenerational bequest model that establishes Ricardian
equivalence when income is not stochastic can be captured by assuming that the
next generation is the final one: the children of the current generation
make no bequests and bear the full burden of any fiscal transfer to the
current generation. The utility of the children can therefore be written as a
function of their own consumption. In the current context, replacing this
specification with an infinite horizon model with each generation linked to
the next through the parents' utility function would only complicate the
analysis without changing anything essential.
The simplest specification of the stochastic nature of second period
income is that the individual receives a fixed amount with probability p
and receives zero with probability 1 -p.It will also eliminate unnecessary
notation without changing anything fundamental to assume that the interest
rate is zero.
In the first period of life, the individual chooses first period
consumption (c1) to maximize expected utility. In the second period, the
individual observes either y2 =ory2 =0and, conditional on that—9-
observation, chooses second period consumption (c2) and a non-negative bequest
(B ) 0) to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint
yl -Cl
+ = c2+B.
Since this generation's utility is a function of the expected utility of
the next generation, some comments about the next generation are in order. In
its first period, the next generation receives income z1 plus the bequest B
from this generation. In its second period, the next generation receives
income Z with robabilitv Dandzero with Drobabilitv 1 -o.Since the next
generation makes no bequest, its utility is a function of its own path of
consumption and its maximum expected utility can be written as a function of
the parameters of its stochastic budget constraint: •(z1÷B,Z2,p).
It will be convenient to restate this with the uncertain second period
income replaced by its certainty equivalent (x2) defined by the condition that
the maximum expected utility that is possible with the parameters z1 +B,Z2
and p is equal to the maximum utility that the individual would obtain subject
to the nonstochastic budget constraint that lifetime consumption is not
greater than z1 +B+x2.Thus q(z1+B,Z2,p) =J,(z1+B+x2).Since bequests are
added to the nonstochastic first period income (z1) in both specifications,
the substitution of the certainty equivalent does not alter the conclusions of
the analysis.
With these assumptions, the first period problem of an individual in the
current generation is to choose c1 to maximize E[u(c1,c2,4,(z1+B+x2))] knowing
that in the second period he will choose c2 and B to maximize
u(c,c2,js(z1+B+x2)) where c? is the value of c1 chosen in period 1. Note that
a positive bequest will be chosen at time 2 only if u3' >u2at B =0,i.e.,
if the marginal utility of the first dollar of bequest exceeds the marginal-10-
utility of an additional dollar of consumption when the bequest level is zero.
The interesting case explored below is the one in which this condition holds
when y2 =butdoes not hold when y2 =0,i.e., when the bequest is made
only when the second period income exceeds its expected value.
To derive explicit parametric and numerical results, I assume that the
utility function is log-linear:
(1) E(u) =inc1 +E(inc2 +aln(z1+B+x2)]
where a reflects the weight that the current generation assigns to the
logarithm of the certainty equivalent income of their prospective heirs. To
find the value of C1 that maximizes expected utility, the individual must
follow the stochastic dynamic programming principle of solving the second
period problem first and then using the optimal conditional values of c2 and B
to find the optimal value of c1. From the vantage point of the second period,
c1 is fixed at c and c2, B must be chosen to maximize in c2 +aln(z1+B+x2)















i.e., if the marginal utility of c2 evaluated at B =0is less than the marginal
utility of increased second generation income, also evaluated at B =0.The
only interesting case in the current analysis is the one in which a bequest is
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This case will be assumed in the analysis that follows.4
Thus y2 =0implies B* =0and c =y1-C? while y2 =V2implies that 8*
maximizes in c2 + aln(z1+B+x2) subject to the constraint that




The first order condition is
(4) — 1 + C =0
y1+Y2—c_B* z1+x2+B*
and implies




Thus when second period income is high enough to make a positive bequest
optimal, the available resources of the two generations are divided in the
ratio a to 1 implied by the parameters of the utility function.
These conditional values of B and c2 can now be substituted into equation
(1) with probability weights p and 1 -pto derive the optimal value of c1.
Thus
(7) E(u) =inc1 + p(1n(1+a1(Y1+Y2+z1+x2—c1)
+ aln(a/1+a)(y1+Y2+z1+x2-c1)]
+ (1—p)(ln(y1—c1) + aln(z1+x2)].—12—
The first order condition for the optimal value of c1 is thus:
8
1- p(1+a) 1 -p
c y1+Y2+z1+x2-c y1-c
or, equivalently, the quadratic equation:
(9) (2i-pa)c!2 —((2—p)(yl+Y2+zl+x2)+ (1+p+pa)y ]c*
+ y1(y1+Y2+z1+x2) =0.
Before analyzing the implications of (9) for the effects of fiscal
policy, it is useful to derive the optimal consumption and bequests in the
same model but without the uncertainty of second period income. If the
individual knows with certainty at the beginning of his life that his second
period income will be pY2 (i.e., the mean of the uncertain distribution), he
will choose c1, c2 and B to maximize ln c1 + in C2 + ain(z1+x2+B) subject to
the budget constraint c1 + c2 + B =y1+ pY2 and the non—negativity constraint
on bequests (B0). This implies the optimal values
y1 + pY2 + z1 + x
(10) c* =
1 2+a





as long as the implied value of B0. If the desired bequest is negative,




3. The Effects of Fiscal Policies
-Weare now ready to analyze how recognizing the uncertainty of second
period income alters the effects of fiscal policy. Consider therefore a tax
cut that raises the first period disposable income of the initial generation
(y1) and increases the national debt that must be repaid by reducing the first
period disposable income of their children (z1). Since the interest rate is
assumed equal to zero, the debt repayment is equal to the initial tax cut:
dy1 =dz1.
Equation (10) shows that in the case of certainty this fiscal policy has
no effect on the first period consumption of the initial generation: dc1 =0
because c1 depends only on the combined endowment of both generations
(y1 +pY2
+z1
+x2)and that is unaffected by increasing y1 and decreasing
z1 by equal amounts. This is the fundamental Ricardian equivalence result of
Barro.
In contrast, equation (9) shows that when the uncertainty of second
period income is recognized a fiscal change that raises y1 and reduces z1 by
an equal amount will not leave c1 unchanged. More specifically, a tax cut
that raises y1 but leaves y1 +z1
unchanged will raise first period





(13) c = 2(2+pa)
where Q =(2-p)(y1+Y2+z1+x2)
+(1+p+pa)y1
>0.It is straightforward to show





dc y1 + + + x2 -(1+p+pa)c
(14)1 2-
4(2+pcz)(y1+Y2+z1+x2)y1
Since the denominator is positive, dc/dy1 > 0 if
yl + V2 + z1 + x2
(15) c* <
1 1+p+pa
Butequation (10) showed that when there is no uncertainty about second period
mci +h rni-4mIr i r** =(V +nY+, 4-i /(4qT1 -cm11irrun+l-I+hri
11 ''1212'' ''' '
theright hand side of (15) since for any p < 1, 2 + a > 1 + p + pa and
pY2 < 2• Moreover, the existence of second period income uncertainty
increases precautionary saving in the first period and therefore implies that
c < Cr. Since c < Cr and cr < (y1+V2+z1+x2)/(1+p+pa), inequality (15) is
satisfied and therefore dc1/dy > 0; a tax cut balanced by a tax increase on
the next generation raises current spending.
Before pursuing the formal analysis any further, it is desirable to ask
why income uncertainty causes Ricardian equivalence to fail. When
second period income is uncertain, the individual does not know at the time
that he chooses c1 whether he will ultimately want to make a bequest. If he
knew with certainty that he was not going to make a bequest, the extra tax
borne by the next generation would be irrelevant to him and he could divide
his tax cut between his own consumption in the first and second periods. More
generally, the individual raises his first period consumption (although by
less than the increase in disposable income), knowing that with probability
1 -phe will not want to make a bequest and will raise his second period
consumption by the remainder. With probability p the individual will have—15-
high income in the second period, will therefore choose to make a bequest, and
will use some of his additional first period saving to make a larger bequest
than he would otherwise have made. Nevertheless, the tax cut raises total
consumption of the initial generation and reduces total consumption of the
next generation even when a bequest is made.
To see this explicitly, note that equation (5) implies that, when a
bequest is to be made, an increase in y1 and an equal decrease in z1 implies
that the next generation's consumption is reduced by a fraction of the induced
consumption:






Since there is no offsetting change in bequest when y2 =0and B* =0,the average
chan9e in second generation income In response to a current tax cut financed




=—(p1 + + (1—p)].
The analysis of social security retirement benefits is essentially
identical in the current context to the analysis of the tax cut. Consider a
program that pays a sure benefitto the current generation In its
second period and finances this by a tax ofon the income of the next
generation. When there is no income uncertainty, the social security program
raises second period income to p?2 +and reduces the next generation's initial
earnings to 21 -, leavingc!* in equation (10) unchanged. In the case of
uncertain second period income, the payment of a sure second period benefit is
analytically identical to a tax cut. To see this, note that y2 =0now implies—16-
=y1-c +so that the payment of the second period benefit is the same
as an increase in first period income if it induces the same c?. Similarly,
when y2 =Y2,the individual maximizes in c2 +a1n(z1-+B+x2)subject to the




+— c?;this is also identical to the
effect of a tax cut that increases y1 and decreases z1 as long as it yields
the same c. To see that the optimal first period consumption is indeed the
same, note that the expression to be maximized in equation (7) is modified in
exactly the same way by the social security program as it would be by a
tax-induced rise in y1 and reduction in z1. Thus a social security program
has the same effect of increasing first generation consumption and reducing
the second generation's subsequent consumption as an equal—sized
intergenerational transfer achieved by a tax cut.6
4. A Numerical Illustration
A numerical example will illustrate the potential effect of income
uncertainty on consumption, on bequests, and on the impact of fiscal policy.
The specific example is obviously arbitrary but indicates the potential
importance of income uncertainty. In the example, the marginal propensity to
consume out of the tax-induced increase in disposable income is almost as
large as the average propensity to consume.
Since the results are essentially independent of the Units of
measurement, I set first period income equal to unity: y1 =1.With p =0.5
and V2 =2,the expected value of second period income is also one. The
economic specification is completed by setting the next generation's first—17—
period income and second period certainty equivalence income both equal to one
as well: z1 =x2
=1.The analysis will be done for two alternative values
of the intergenerational altruism parameters: a =1and a =3.
Consider first the case in which there is no uncertainty. Second period
income is pY2 =1and is known with certainty. From equation (12), the
optimal bequest is B** =max(4a/(2+a)-2,0].Thus with a =1the individual
gives too little weight to the next generation to make any bequest and
=0.In this case the individual consumes all of his income in each
period: Cr =q* = 1.0.With a =3,there is enough weight on the next
generation's welfare to induce a bequest: B** =0.4and cr =c*
=0.8.
When second period income is uncertain, the optimal value of c1 is given
by equation (13). With a =1,c =0.6311while a =3implies ct =0.5937.
In both cases, first period consumption is substantially less than it would be
if the same expected second period income could be anticipated with certainty.
This reflects both the precautionary demand for saving (against the risk that
=0)and the saving for subsequent bequests (if y2 =2).
If y2 =0,the individual will choose to make no bequest with a =1or
with a =3.In contrast, if y2 =2the individual will choose a bequest of
8* =0.1844with a =1and 8* =1.3047with a =3.Thus with a =1the income
uncertainty increases the average bequest from B =0to pB* =0.0922and
with a =3the income uncertainty increases the average bequest from
=0.40to p8* =0.6524.
Consider now the effect of a fiscal policy that increases the initial
generation's first period disposable income from y1 =1.0to y1 =1.1and
reduces the corresponding disposable income of the next generation from
=1.0to z1 =.9.This raises the first period consumption from-18-
c =0.6311with a =1and y1 =1.0to c! =0.6896with a =1and y1 =1.1;
the increase of 0.0585 implies a marginal propensity to consume out of the
fiscal transfer of 0.585, almost as high as the initial average propensity to
consume of 0.631. Similarly, with a =3,first period consumption rises from
c =0.5937to c =0.6434,implying a marginal propensity to consume out of
the fiscal transfer 0.497, approximately 85 percent of the average propensity
to consume.
The fiscal transfer induces an increased bequest, although not a large
enough increase to maintain the consumption of the next generation. This is
true even if attention is limited to the case in which y2 =2so that a
bequest is made. For example, with a =1the bequest when y2 =2rises from
B* =0.1844to B* =0.2552but the increased bequest of 0.0708 is less than
the increased tax of 0.10 paid by the next generation. Moreover, the fiscal
transfer only raises the average bequest from 0.5(0.1844)0.0922 to
0.5(0.2552) =0.1276,an increase of 0.0354 in comparison to the universal tax
rise of 0.1000. Similarly, with a =3,the bequest when y2 =2rises from
B* =1.3047with y1 =1.0to B* =1.3674when y1 =1.1.The increased bequest
(0.0627) is slightly smaller then with a =1and offsets less than two—thirds
of the tax increase even among those who receive a bequest. More generally,
the average bequest rises from 0.5(1.3047) =0.6524to 0.5(1.3674) =0.6837,
a rise of 0.0313 or less than one-third of the average tax increase.—19-
5. Concluding Comment
This paper has shown that the inability of individuals to predict
accurately their subsequent earnings implies that fiscal transfers from future
generations to the current generation will raise current consumption. Thus
earnings uncertainty is incompatible with Ricardian equivalence. The
individual's uncertainty of his future income also reduces consumption and
increases the probability and expected size of bequests.
Unlike the uncertainty that arises because the time of death is unknown,
the unpredictability of individual future income cannot be avoided even in
principle by an annuity market or other insurance market. The uncertainty of
personal earnings Is unavoidable because of the moral hazard problem involved
in trying to insure individual earnings.
The very simple model developed in this paper can demonstrate the
potential importance of earnings uncertainty and the general inapplicability
of Ricardian equivalence. It would be desirable to extend this analysis to a
more realistic specification of uncertainty and to analyze the implications
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1.This group includes Don Patinkin (1956), Martin Bailey (1971), and Merton
Miller and C. Upton (1974).It is not clear whether David Ricardo actually
believed this to be true; see Ricardo (1951) and Gerald O'Driscoll (1977).
2.Although there have been several analyses of life cycle models with
uncertain income and asset returns (see, e.g., Agnar Sandmo (1970), Jacques
Dreze and Franco Modigliani (1972) and Robert Barsky, Gregory Mankiw and
Stephen Zeldes (1986)), these have not dealt with the relation between income
uncertainty and bequests.
3. For such an analysis, see Feldstein (1987).
4. The case where a bequest is always optimal corresponds to the original
Barro analysis despite the income uncertainty while the case where a bequest
is never optimal is contrary to the observation that individuals do make
bequests.
5. This is the only feasible solution of the quadratic equation; adding
instead of subtracting the square root expression implies a value of c1
greater than initial income.
6.This assumes that the size of the second period benefit is not so large
that the individual wants to consume more than his entire first period income.
In this case, it is still true that the benefit increases first period
consumption but by less than the rise that would result from an equally large
tax reduction.—21—
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